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COMMENTS
Constitutional Law: The Province and Duty of the Judicial
Department: Why the Court Cannot Continue to Use
Justiciability to Avoid Dealing with the Tension Between
Congress and the President Regarding the War Powers
Article I: "The Congress shall have Power ... To declare
War. "
- U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8
Article II. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy."
- U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2
Article III: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
L Introduction
The United States is facing a war. This war will not be fought on a field of
battle, but in our nation's capital. It is about who holds the power to commit
this nation to military action: Congress or the President. The U.S.
Constitution clearly gives the power to declare war to Congress.' It also, just
as clearly, gives the President the title of Commander in Chief, with all
attendant powers.2 We are a government of laws defined by three definite
governmental components with a belief in checks and balances.3 The issue
of who holds the war powers tests that principle. Our system of checks and
balances allows for the tension between the legislative and executive branches
to be decided by the third co-equal branch of our government, the judiciary.4
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11.
2. U.S. CONST. art. l1, § 2, cl. 1.
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72-73
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 401-02
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALISTNO. 73, at 442 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
4. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (tension between legislature and executive
resolved byjudiciary); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishingjudicial
review).
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The Supreme Court has not yet cast that deciding vote because the Court has
deemed the cases dealing with the war powers that have thus far come before
it as nonjusticiable.' If there is no justiciable case allowing the judiciary to
decide this issue, there is no way for Congress to prevent the President from
usurping its power to declare war. If there is no justiciable case, the country's
most serious decision, a decision that possibly affects the lives of every man,
woman, and child in the United States and elsewhere, essentially rests with
one person, shattering our very concept of limited government.6
The Constitution is an amazingly concise document of roughly 6000 words,
which indicates that the powers delegated therein are fundamental. The
framers recognized the danger of instilling the awesome power of declaring
war in a single individual, while simultaneously recognizing the impracticality
of leaving command of the armed forces to a group of individuals.7 Over the
years, the security from a war-hungry dictator gave way to the practicalities
of a single military commander, until the nation found itself engaged in a war
driven by one man, a war that was not technically a war because Congress did
not so declare it - the Vietnam war.' Congress tried to ensure that its power
would not be usurped in the future by passing the War Powers Resolution of
1973. 9 However, the Resolution merely intensified the debate over who holds
the power to declare war while solving nothing.
The Supreme Court's resolution of the tension between the legislative and
executive branches regarding the war powers will likely be in a case
predicated on a president's violation of the War Powers Resolution. In
deciding the constitutionality of the Resolution, the Court would essentially
be defining Congress' power to declare war. If the Court finds that the
Resolution is a constitutional delineation of Congress' power, it will implicitly
adopt the Resolution's rules as the constitutional definition of war. On the
other hand, the Court may find that the Resolution is an unconstitutional
overstepping by Congress into the President's powers as Commander in Chief,
implicitly defining war as something greater than that described in the
Resolution.
Thus, the fundamental issue in this debate is the constitutionality of the
War Powers Resolution. Every President since the passage of the Resolution,
5. These cases are discussed infra Part V.
6. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301-03 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 417-18 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447-79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
8. The Vietnam War's role in the birth of the War Powers Resolution is discussed infra
Part Il.




"both liberals and conservatives, whether Republican or Democrat, have all
attacked" the War Powers Resolution.' Even some members of Congress
have challenged its constitutionality." However, Congress as a whole has
maintained and defended the constitutionality of the Resolution. 2 Despite
attempts to repeal it, the Resolution still stands.' 3 The issue ultimately will
need to be decided by the judiciary. Indeed, it is the judiciary's duty to do
so. 4 Such faith in our judicial system as the final arbitrator of constitutional
dilemmas is vested in our judiciary.' Of course, potential court intervention
raises additional issues: Even if the Court can, should it make this decision? 6
And more fundamentally, who, if anyone, has standing to sue a President for
violation of the War Powers Resolution?
This comment attempts to answer each of the foregoing questions to
provide clarity to these troubling issues. Part I details the recent events that
have led to speculation that the case that finally resolves the tension over the
war powers may not be long in coming. Part ImI explains the background of
the War Powers Resolution, including why it was written, which Presidents
have followed it, which have not, and what it requires. Part IV explains the
constitutional doctrine of standing, including the reasons for the standing
analysis and a description of its requirements. Part V explores the pool of
potential plaintiffs under the War Powers Resolution and predicts whether the
Court would likely find standing for each of them. Part VI explores whether
the Court might continue to avoid a definitive ruling on the Resolution by
labeling the issue a nonjusticiable political question. Part VII offers several
conclusions: a suit against a President for violating the War Powers Resolu-
tion would probably not be deemed nonjusticiable under the political question
doctrine. However, if the suit were brought by an individual member of
Congress, it probably would be considered nonjusticiable because of the
member's lack of standing. Conversely, the suit probably would be
considered justiciable if it were brought by a majority of Congress suing
10. Ronald D. Rotunda, The War Powers Act in Perspective, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 1,
1(1997).
11. Id.; see also Mike Allen & Juliet Eilperin, Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill
Vote, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2002, at Al (reporting that Vice President Dick Cheney called the
War Powers Resolution unconstitutional when he was a member of Congress).
12. J. Richard Broughton, What Is It Good For? War Power, Judicial Review, and Consti-
tutional Deliberation, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 685, 689-90 (2001).
13. Id.
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
15. See id.
16. This inquiry is addressed by the political question doctrine, discussed infra Part VI.
See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (leading case on the political question doctrine).
2003]
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jointly; a personally injured member of the public, or military personnel,
because these three groups would have standing to sue the President for
violating the War Powers Resolution. Therefore, it is possible, and in fact
probable, that a case will arise requiring the Court to finally settle the tension
between Congress and the President regarding the war powers.
II. The Recent Debate
On August 26, 2002, President George W. Bush's senior officials
announced that the President's lawyers had advised him that he did not need
to seek congressional approval before launching a military attack against Iraqi
president Saddam Hussein, 7 despite the requirements of the Constitution 8 and
the War Powers Resolution of 1973.' This conclusion was based partly on
the President's constitutional role as Commander in Chief and partly on the
theory that the President may act pursuant to the congressional permission
given in 1991 to Bush's father, the former President, to fight Saddam Hussein
in the Persian Gulf War.2"
This announcement sparked a nationwide debate on the legal and practical
ramifications of any military action taken by the President without
congressional support.2 ' As one administration official observed, "The legal
question and the practical question may be very different. There is a view that
while there is not a legal necessity to seek anything further, as a matter of
statesmanship and politics and practicality, it's necessary - or at a minimum
advisable - to do it."22 Yale International Law Professor Harold Hongju Koh
reiterated this view, saying, "[T]his argument may permit them to get into the
war, but it won't give them the political support at home and abroad to sustain
that effort.,23 Indeed, a number of lawmakers expressed the view that
regardless of the legal requirements, President Bush should "seek Congress'
approval ... because it's the right thing to do."'24
17. Randall Mikkelsen, Bush LawyersBelieve Vote NotNeededforlraq War, Reuters, Aug.
26, 2002 (on file with author).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (giving Congress the power to declare war).
19. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555.
20. Allen & Eilperin, supra note 11, at Al.
21. See Judy Keen & William M. Welch, Bush Takes Control of Debate on Iraq, USA
TODAY, Sept. 5, 2002, at A7 ("For the past month, it has sometimes seemed that everyone but
President Bush was talking about Iraq.... [D]ebate over the wisdom of going to war to topple
Saddam Hussein raged in newspapers and on TV talk shows. Members of Congress, including
Republicans, expressed qualms.").
22. Allen & Eilperin, supra note 11, at Al.
23. Id.
24. Ken Guggenheim, Lawmakers Say Bush Must Seek Congressional Support Before




Practicalities aside, many commentators contended that President Bush was
legally bound to ask Congress' permission pursuant to both Congress'
constitutional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
The former Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Patrick Leahy,
stated that "the administration should not expect to commit American troops
to war with a wink and a nod to Congress. There should be a full debate and
a vote. That is what the Constitution prescribes, and that is what the
American people expect."25 Both Republican and Democratic congressional
leaders agreed with Leahy's view.26 While President Bush promised to
consult Congress before taking any action, he steadfastly maintained that he
did not need to ask for permission.17 Maintaining that no congressional
resolution was necessary, one senior official candidly asserted, "[W]e don't
want, in getting a resolution, to have conceded that one was constitutionally
necessary."2 However, on September 5, 2002, President Bush announced that
he would seek congressional approval before taking military action.29 His
announcement "was applauded by those who have griped that he seemed ready
to go to war without acknowledging Congress' constitutional role in
deployment of U.S. troops."30  Subsequently, Congress voted
overwhelmingly3' to give President Bush that approval on October 11, 2002,
authorizing the President to take military action to remove Saddam Hussein
from power.32
However, this vote settled the debate only temporarily. Following Presi-
dent Bush's State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, Senator Edward
Kennedy made a statement that rekindled the debate.33 He pointed out that
25. Barry Schweid, Bush Administration Struggles for Support from Congress, Other
Nations, AP NEWSWIRES, Aug. 29, 2002.
26. Laurence McQuillan, President Reaches Out to Congress, USA TODAY, Sept. 4,2002,
at A2. Congress voted to issue a joint resolution against Iraq in conformity with the
requirements of the War Powers Resolution on October 11, 2002. See H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th
Cong. (2002) (enacted); see also Tom Raum, Congress Passes Iraq War Resolution, AP
NEWSWHZES, Oct. 11, 2002.
27. McQuillan, supra note 26, at A2.
28. Allen & Eilperin, supra note 11, at Al.
29. Keen & Welch, supra note 21, at A7.
30. Id.
31. The resolution passed 77 to 23 in the Senate and 296 to 139 in the House of
Representatives. Jim VandeHei & Juliet Eilperin, Congress Passes Iraq Resolution, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 2002, at Al.
32. H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted); see also Raum, supra note 26 (reporting
on the resolutions and the surrounding debate); VandeHei & Eilperin, supra note 31, at Al
(discussing the passage of the resolutions, including numerous quotes from members of
Congress both for and against the resolutions).
33. Reaction of Senator Edward M. Kennedy to President Bush's State of the Union
2003]
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circumstances had changed since the October 2002 vote, both in Iraq and in
other parts of the world, and proposed that there should be another full debate
and vote in Congress before war with Iraq.' However, Senate support for
such a proposal was weak,35 and another vote did not occur before the
invasion of Iraq.
A potential plaintiff could very easily use this lack of new approval as a
predicate for a claim that the President violated the War Powers Resolution.
In fact, two such lawsuits were filed and subsequently dismissed. In Doe v.
Bush,3 6 a number of active-duty military personnel, parents of military
personnel, and members of the U.S. House of Representatives sought an
injunction to prevent war in Iraq.37 The First Circuit dismissed the case,
declaring it unripe because Congress had not expressed an objection to war.3"
In Callan v. Bush,39 a former Congressman claimed the President's attack on
Iraq violated the War Powers Resolution.' The district court dismissed the
suit, holding that (1) former Representative Clair Callen did not have standing
because he had not been personally injured, and (2) the suit violated the
political question doctrine.4 These decisions were appealed, but because the
fighting in Iraq has ended, the claims are probably moot. Nevertheless, the
constitutional questions regarding the power to engage troops remain
unresolved, and because of the seemingly perpetual state of countries at war,
such questions are certain to be raised again in the future. Indeed, the same
questions arose during the presidencies of Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan,
George Bush, and Bill Clinton.42 At some point the judiciary needs to address
these important unresolved issues.
IlL The War Powers Resolution





35. Ken Guggenheim, Senators Express Worry on War in Iraq, AP ONLINE, Jan. 30,2003.
36. 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003).
37. Id. at 134.
38. Id. at 134-35.
39. No. 4:03CV3060 (D. Neb. Apr. 30, 2003) (memorandum and order dismissing case),
available at http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/iraq/cllnbsh43003mem.pdf.
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id. at 3-4.
42. Washington Post, War Powers Act Timeline (2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter





to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United
States and insure that the collective judgement of both the
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities
or in such situations.43
The Resolution came as a direct response to the executive branch's abuse of
the war powers that led to the Vietnam War.' It was believed that the people
wanted Congress to have a say in military action to protect the country from
"a President too quick to spill American blood., 45
The requirements of the War Powers Resolution are fairly straightforward.
The first requirement is that "[t]he President in every possible instance shall
consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into
hostilities." Second, when there is any introduction of U.S. armed forces
into ongoing hostilities, into a situation where circumstances indicate
imminent hostilities, or into a foreign country ready for combat, the President
has forty-eight hours to submit a written report to Congress.47 The writing
should contain: "(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of
United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority
under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and
duration of the hostilities or involvement." '4 The President should provide
supplemental reports thereafter no less than once every six months.49 The
President must withdraw the military forces within sixty calendar days of
either submitting a report or engaging in action that should have prompted him
to submit a report, unless Congress declares war, otherwise authorizes military
action, extends the time limit by sixty days, or is unable to meet because of an
attack upon the United States.5" If Congress has not authorized military
action, but the President takes such action anyway, the President must
withdraw the forces if "Congress so directs by concurrent resolution."'"
43. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555, 555.
44. Edwin B. Firmage, The War Power of Congress and Revision of the War Powers
Resolution, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 237, 237 (1991).
45. Rotunda, supra note 10, at 8.
46. § 3, 87 Stat. at 555.
47. § 4(a), 87 Stat. at 555-56.
48. § 4(a)(3), 87 Stat. at 556.
49. § 4(c), 87 Stat. at 556.
50. § 5(b), 87 Stat. at 556.
51. § 5(c), 87 Stat. at 556-67.
2003]
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Congress based its authority to create the Resolution on Article 1, Section
8, Clause 18 of the Constitution, which reads:
it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power
to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution,
not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof.52
The Resolution is also based on the intent of the framers of the Constitution,
who indicated in their comments that they felt that the power to wage war was
much too great to leave to the President alone.53 This intent is manifested in
the Constitution's unequivocal mandate that "[t]he Congress shall have
Power... [t]o declare War."54
Despite its apparent constitutional basis, the War Powers Resolution has
consistently been criticized as unconstitutional." "Since its enactment, no
President has explicitly approved of the War Powers Resolution and all have
disputed its constitutionality in light of the Commander in Chief Clause."56
However, the constitutionality of the Resolution has never been judicially
tested, in part because of the problem with standing.57 For example, when
several congressmen sued President Clinton for violating the War Powers
Resolution, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals never considered the
constitutionality of the Resolution because it found that the congressmen
lacked standing, thus preventing the court from addressing any of the
arguments raised. 8
Some of the Presidents who have criticized the Resolution have nonetheless
complied with it. For example, Gerald Ford called the Resolution
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
53. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (D.D.C. 1990).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11. It should be noted that there are few enumerated
powers in the Constitution, and this is one of them. This indicates just how crucial the framers
considered the delegation of the power to declare war to Congress.
55. See Broughton, supra note 12, at 689-90 (noting that the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution has been criticized by Presidents and by Congressmen); Martin Wald, The
Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1407, 1419-20 (1984) (stating that
Congress' War Powers Resolution-authorized ability to order the President to withdraw troops
from hostilities by concurrent resolution "has been widely criticized as an unconstitutional
'legislative veto"').
56. Broughton, supra note 12, at 689.
57. There are three requirements for standing: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3)
redressability. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). See also infra Part IV for an in-
depth discussion of the standing requirements.




"unconstitutional" and "impractical," 59 but he still complied by reporting to
Congress and by limiting military action against Cambodia in 1975 to stay
within the Resolution's time limit.' However, not all Presidents have
complied. In fact, "Presidents of both parties have been accused of ignoring
the law.' 6' Both Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush conducted a number
of "quick" wars62 without congressional approval, claiming that they did not
need approval because the hostilities lasted less than sixty days.63 President
Reagan ignored the Resolution in 1982-83 when he deployed U.S. Marines to
Beirut, Lebanon, but Congress was reluctant to raise the Resolution issue and
speak out against the President's actions lest the U.S. appear weak.'
President George H.W. Bush likewise ignored the Resolution during the
1990-91 Persian Gulf War. 65 During Operation Desert Shield, President Bush
deployed massive amounts of equipment and troops to Kuwait without
consulting Congress.66 The mobilization was in preparation for substantial
military action, thus triggering the War Powers Resolution.67 However,
[e]ven as President Bush sought Congress' approval on January 8,
1991, he continued to maintain that he had authority to act without
legislative authorization. In fact, the War Powers Resolution
should have been invoked on August 7, 1990, when the U.S.
announced its commitment to defend Saudi Arabia if attacked by
Iraq.... However, Congress could not muster support to challenge
the President. When Congress finally voted to authorize the use of
force, over 400,000 troops had been deployed and withdrawing any
troops would question American credibility around the globe.
Therefore, to protect American credibility, Congress was
compelled to vote for war.6"
This after-the-fact congressional authorization quashed any potential lawsuits
over the President's initial disregard of the War Powers Resolution.69
59. Rotunda, supra note 10, at 2.
60. War Powers Act Timeline, supra note 42.
61. Rotunda, supra note 10, at 2.
62. It should be noted that these armed conflicts were not technically wars because
Congress has not declared war since World War II. John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional
Text, 69 U. Cii. L. REv. 1639, 1663 (2002).
63. Firmage, supra note 44, at 253-54.
64. Id. at 251-52.
65. Id. at 254-55.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 238 (citations omitted).
69. One such lawsuit had already been filed and dismissed by the D.C. Circuit Court
20031
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The issue of the War Powers Resolution next arose on October 25, 1994,
when Congress invoked the Resolution after President Bill Clinton deployed
forces to Haiti.7" Despite this invocation of the Resolution, Congress never
asked the President to disengage the forces,7' but merely told him to ask first
next time.72 Furthermore, Congress appropriated funds to finance the
conflict.73 Nevertheless, this implicit support did not prevent several
Congressmen from suing the President for the violation in Campbell v.
Clinton,74 although ultimately the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that the Congressmen lacked standing.75
In summary, Congress essentially intended the War Powers Resolution to
be a tool for use in maintaining its constitutional power to declare war, while
leaving to the President his constitutional powers as Commander in Chief.
However, the Resolution has been continuously criticized as overstepping
these bounds and allowing Congress to take constitutional powers from the
President. The Resolution has been largely ignored, discounted, and viewed
more as an unconstitutional obstacle than a tool for ensuring proper checks
and balances in our government. No judicial decision has yet clarified the
issue by determining the constitutionality of the Resolution. One major hurdle
in obtaining such a decision has been the judicial requirement of standing.
IV. Standing
A. Overview
Standing means that the plaintiff is the right person to raise the particular
cause of action.76 Put another way, standing determines "whether the litigant
is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular
issues. 7 7 If the plaintiff does not have standing, the court cannot hear the
because of a lack of ripeness. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). This case
is discussed in detail infra Part V.B.
70. Gerald G. Howard, Comment, Combat in Kosovo: Ignoring the WarPowersResolution,
38 HOus. L. REv. 261, 280 (2001).
71. Mark B. Stem, Congress, Standing and the War Powers Act, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 205,
206 (2001).
72. Howard, supra note 70, at 280.
73. Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The Past,
Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 209, 211 (2001).
74. 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
75. Id. at 20. This case is discussed in greater detail infra Part V.A.
76. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONALLAW 33 (2001) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY 1].




case.7" Thus, standing must be among the first issues considered by a court.7 9
The primary question for standing is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's
remedial powers on his behalf."'
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified three constitutional requirements for
standing, which may be summed up in one sentence: "A plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."'" The first requirement is
injury in fact. 2 The plaintiff must allege that he has suffered an actual injury,
or is in imminent harm of suffering an actual injury, and that the injury is not
conjectural or hypothetical.8 3 The next requirement is causation." The
traditional legal test for causation simply asks whether the defendant's
conduct caused the plaintiffs injury." The final requirement is
redressability.8 6 The plaintiff must allege that a finding in the plaintiff's favor
will rectify his injury." Simply put, could a court issue a ruling that would
78. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 770 (1984).
79. At the initial stage of a lawsuit, the court considers issues of justiciability, including
ripeness, mootness, political question doctrine, and standing. CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76,
at 28.
80. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
81. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
82. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
83. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743-44 (1995) (requiring an actual injury for
standing); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (pointing out that the
plaintiff must show that he or she has suffered an actual injury or is in immediate danger of
suffering an injury); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (holding that a plaintiff "must allege a distinct and
palpable injury to himself"); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating
that imminent harm is adequate); CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 33 (discussing injury
requirement).
84. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 (holding that an injury is inadequate because it "is not fairly
traceable to the assertedly unlawful conduct" of the defendant); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614,617-18 (1973) (finding that an injury is insufficient when there is not a nexus between
it and the defendant's action); CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 52 (discussing causation
requirement).
85. See sources cited supra note 84.
86. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (holding that "the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury
as a result of a favorable ruling" cannot be "too speculative" for there to be standing); Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261-62 (1977) (holding that, in
assessing redressability, "a court is not required to engage in undue speculation as a predicate
for finding that the plaintiff has the requisite personal stake in the controversy"; it is enough that
the injury is likely to be redressed); CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 52 (discussing
redressability requirement).
87. CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 52.
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solve the problem? All three requirements must be met for a plaintiff to have
standing. These three requirements seem simple and straightforward, yet the
Supreme Court has warned that they "cannot be defined so as to make
application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical
exercise.""8 The outward simplicity of these requirements belies the difficult
analysis that accompanies each case in which standing is at issue. 9
In addition to the constitutional requirements for standing, there are two
prudential principles. The judiciary has developed these principles for
practical reasons, namely to guarantee that the plaintiff has a sufficient interest
in the matter and to prevent overload to the judicial system.9° The first
prudential limitation is that a third party usually cannot sue - in other words,
the plaintiff must have suffered the injury.9 If the plaintiff did not suffer the
injury, the plaintiff is the wrong person to bring the lawsuit, and thus does not
have standing. The second prudential limitation is that a citizen may not sue
for a common grievance of all citizens.92 This is because a generalized
grievance is not really an injury. However, at least one constitutional scholar
has suggested that these standards are not generally considered constitutional
bars, and therefore Congress may statutorily override them.93 For example,
Congress may include in a statute a provision providing a specific cause of
action, stipulating that the action may be brought by a third party or by any
member of the public, thus allowing a plaintiff standing despite violating a
prudential limitation.94
The concept of standing is based on the fundamental constitutional
principle of the judiciary's proper role in light of the Constitution's separation
of powers. 95 Standing enhances the separation of powers by restricting the
situations in which the judiciary may intervene.96 However, standing should
88. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
89. Id. at 752.
90. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998); Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 112, 113-14 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975).
91. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500 (("[Tjhe plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.").
There are notable exceptions to this rule. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-97 (1976)
(holding that third-party standing is allowed when there is economic injury); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973) (providing for an exception for situations capable of repetition yet
evading review).
92. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
93. CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 33.
94. Id.
95. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).





not be unduly restrictive, damaging the doctrine of separation of powers by
eliminating the checks and balances the judiciary provides.97 This delicate
balance is part of what makes standing such an important issue.
Article Ell of the U.S. Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to
"actual cases or controversies."" This limitation is generally called
justiciability." In Flast v. Cohen,"° the Supreme Court commented on the
cases and controversies restriction, saying, "As is so often the situation in
constitutional adjudication, those two words have an iceberg quality,
containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go
to the very heart of our constitutional form of government."'' The
justiciability limitation is indeed complex: it includes the concepts of the
political question doctrine, mootness, ripeness, and, first and foremost,
standing. 10 2 "[T]he Supreme Court has declared that standing is the most
important justiciability requirement."' 0 3
A multitude of cases have thoroughly analyzed the question of standing, so
determining whether a particular plaintiff has standing can often be
accomplished by reviewing previous cases with similar allegations."
However, simply because a court found one plaintiff to have standing does not
mean that it will find an analogous plaintiff to have standing. Subtle
differences in not only the plaintiffs and their unique situations, but also in the
judges, can have a tremendous effect on the outcome. 5 In fact, some
commentators have even suggested that "the Court has manipulated standing
rules based on its views of the merits of particular cases."'" Indeed, Justice
Brennan implied as much in his dissent to the Court's decision in Warth v.
97. Id.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
99. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
100. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
101. Id. at 94.
102. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,750 (1984) (stating that the most important of the
Article RI doctrines - standing, mootness, ripeness, and political question - is standing);
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 171 n.3 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that the elements ofjusticiability are standing,
ripeness, mootness, and political question doctrine); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166,
1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that the Article I doctrines are standing, mootness, ripeness,
and political question).
103. CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 32.
104. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751-52.
105. "Standing frequently has been identified by both justices and commentators as one of
the most confused areas of the law. . . . 'Judicial behavior is erratic, even bizarre."'
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Seldin,10 7 cautioning that "courts cannot refuse to hear a case on the merits
merely because they would prefer not to."' 8
Despite its inconsistencies, standing is extremely important to the judicial
process." "Standing 'serves, on occasion, as a shorthand expression for all
the various elements ofjusticiability."' Often, when a plaintiff presents a case
that is nonjusticiable for reasons other than standing, the case fails the
standing test as well. For instance, if a case is moot, the court may decide that
it is not redressable, and thus the plaintiff does not have standing." An
example of this would be a situation in which a student sued over a school
policy or action, but the student graduated before the case came to trial."'
The judge may deem the case moot because the issue no longer affects the
student, or the judge may decide that the plaintiff lacks standing because the
situation is not redressable because any decision of the court would no longer
remedy the plaintiff's injury. Likewise, if a case is not ripe, the court may
decide that no actual injury exists. 2 For instance, a person could sue for an
injury that may occur, but which is not imminent." 3 The court could use
either a lack of injury, and thus a lack of standing, or a lack of ripeness to
determine that the case is nonjusticiable. Therefore, the standing analysis is
usually the first - and sometimes the last - step in a case." 4
Furthermore, the standing doctrine promotes judicial efficiency in the
following ways: (1) it prevents plaintiffs from seeking advisory opinions; (2)
it promotes judicial decision making by preventing lawsuits where no real
controversy exists and by requiring "an advocate with a sufficient personal
concern to effectively litigate the matter;" and (3) it promotes fairness by
preventing meddlers from raising the claims of others when they do not want
107. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
108. Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Thomas P. Lewis, Constitutional
Rights and the Misuse of 'Standing,' 14 STAN. L. REV. 433, 453 (1962)); see also Warth, 422
U.S. at 498 (stating that "standing imports justiciability").
110. The converse is also true. In DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), the Court
determined that the case was moot because the outcome of the case would not affect the injury.
Id. at 317. Thus, both moomess and redressability may be addressed by assessing whether the
outcome of the case would affect the injury, and if a particular case is moot, it also lacks
standing, and vice versa. See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983)
(holding that the plaintiff does not present Article Il case or controversy because the injury is
not likely to happen to him again, then subsequently referring to the lack of jurisdiction as
caused by both a lack of redressability and mootness, implying that the two are interchangeable).
111. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
112. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-09.
113. See id.at 101-02.
114. Whether a plaintiff has standing "is the threshold question in every federal case,




to assert their own rights." 5 Moreover, standing prevents courts from
addressing questions that they have no right to address - questions best left
to the political process." 6 That is why the courts cannot find that a plaintiff
has standing merely because no one has a better claim of standing." 7
The constitutional requirements for standing - injury in fact, causation,
and redressability - as well as the prudential limitations on third-party
complaints and against generalized grievances are addressed in detail below.
B. Constitutional Requirement 1: Injury In Fact
The first, and arguably most important, requirement for standing is injury.
To have standing, a plaintiff must personally have been actually injured." 8 A
generalized grievance is insufficient. "' The injury requirement is crucial to
avoid cases where the litigants are not adverse and the court is merely being
asked for an advisory opinion. 20 Beyond the general categories of injuries to
common law rights, constitutional rights, and statutory rights, no clear
guidelines exist as to what is sufficient to constitute an injury for the purposes
of the standing requirement. ' Even within these categories, the Court can be
inconsistent. In fact, some constitutional scholars suggest that "a plaintiff has
standing if he or she asserts an injury that the Court deems sufficient for
standing purposes."' 22 Congress may create a statutory right, the violation of
which would presumably be considered an injury, even if it were not an injury
in the absence of the statute. 23 However, Justice Scalia has stated that,
"[w]hether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases,
they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct
constitutional role of the Third Branch," indicating that not every violation of
115. CHEMERINSKY 2, supra note 96, § 2.5.1, at 61.
116. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974). The
political question doctrine is discussed in further detail infra Part VI.
117. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227. "The assumption that if respondents have no standing
to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing." Id.
118. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995).
119. Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,573-74 (1992) (holding that
a generalized grievance is not an Article Ill case or controversy); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974) (stating that federal court is an inappropriate place to air generalized
grievances); CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 54 (discussing generalized grievance
prohibition).
120. CHEMERINSKY 2, supra note 96, § 2.5.2, at 63.
121. Id. § 2.5.2, at 69.
122. Id. § 2.5.2, at 74.
123. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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a statutory right is a sufficient injury for the purposes of standing. 24
Furthermore, sometimes the Court considers an injury insufficient for
practical reasons, including instances where if one plaintiff is deemed to have
standing, millions of others would also have standing.',25 Such a situation is
often better handled through other methods such as legislation.
2 6
One interesting trait of the injury requirement is that sometimes an injury
need not have already taken place - an imminent harm may be sufficient in
some situations.'27 The Supreme Court has stated that a"plaintiff does not
have to wait for the threatened harm to occur before obtaining standing."'28
Another interesting attribute is that a noneconomic injury may suffice.'2 9 In
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP),3° the plaintiffs' only injury was to "their use and enjoyment of the
natural resources of the Washington area," with no financial or physical
injury, yet the Court still found the injury to be sufficient to confer standing.'
3'
An indirect injury may also be sufficient in certain circumstances. In the
ordinary case, "[w]hen the suit is one challenging the legality of government
action or inaction... [and] the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or
forgone action) at issue ..... there is ordinarily little question that the action
or inaction has caused him injury."'32 However, the more interesting case is
one in which the plaintiff is not the direct object of the government action. In
such cases, the Court has held that standing is not precluded merely because
the plaintiff' s harm was indirect.'33 If a restriction imposed on someone other
than the plaintiff results in an actual injury to the plaintiff, "the indirectness
of the injury does not necessarily deprive the person harmed of standing to
vindicate his rights."'"T The touchstone is that the plaintiff has suffered an
injury.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff did not suffer, and will not suffer, an
actual injury, the plaintiff does not have standing. In United States v. Hays,
35
the Supreme Court held that voters did not have standing, to sue over a
124. Id. at 576.
125. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984).
126. Id.
127. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (stating that imminent
harm is sufficient for standing, although plaintiff was not in danger of imminent harm).
128. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147 (D.D.C. 1990).
129. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 112 (1979).
130. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
131. Id. at686-87.
132. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992).
133. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1975).
134. Id. at 505.




congressional redistricting scheme that represented racial gerrymandering
when the voters did not live in the district that was the focus of the suit.
136
The Court found that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite injury necessary to
convey standing, finding that the plaintiffs were not subjected to the scheme,
and thus were not injured.
137
The plaintiff's description of the injury makes a significant difference in the
standing analysis, as does the type of relief requested. A plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief must show not only that he has personally suffered an injury,
but also that there is a likelihood of future harm.'38 In City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons,'39 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue
over a policy allowing police to use a potentially fatal choke hold in situations
not requiring deadly force. 4 0 The Court found that although the plaintiff had
been subjected to the choke hold in the past, the odds of him being subjected
to it again in the future were too slight to represent an injury for the purposes
of standing.'4 ' The plaintiff had suffered an injury, but that injury was
insufficient to convey standing because the plaintiff requested injunctive
relief.
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly refused to recognize a generalized
grievance against allegedly illegal governmental conduct as [an injury]
sufficient for standing to invoke the federal judicial power."'42 Such a suit
violates both the prudential limitation against generalized grievances,
discussed in Part IV.D.2, and the constitutional requirement of actual injury.
Thus, knowledge that a law is being violated is by itself not a sufficient
injury.'43 The Supreme Court has clearly stated "that an asserted right to have
the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone,
to confer jurisdiction on a federal court."'" An actual injury must be alleged.
For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 145 a group of conservationists
sued the Secretary of the Interior, claiming that the Endangered Species Act
should be applied to more than just federally funded projects. 146 The injury
alleged was that failing to apply the Act to all projects increased the rate of
136. Id. at 739.
137. Id. While the voters in the district at issue were subjected to the scheme, and thus were
injured, they were not parties to the litigation. Id. at 745.
138. CHEMERINSKY 2, supra note 96, § 2.5.2, at 66.
139. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
140. Id. at 109.
141. Id.
142. Hays, 515 U.S. at 743.
143. Id. at 745.
144. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984).
145. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
146. Id. at 559.
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extinction of certain animals.'47 The Court found this injury insufficient.'48
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out that "[t]his is not a case
where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard
of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs," implying that if
the plaintiffs had suffered an actual injury, they would have standing.14 9
Furthermore, an injury cannot be something invented just go get past the
standing analysis. In United States v. SCRAP, the Court stated that "pleadings
must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable. A plaintiff must allege that he has been or will in fact be
perceptibly harmed, . . . not that he can imagine circumstances in which he
could be affected."' ° In summary, standing requires an actual, concrete
injury, or the imminent threat of an actual, concrete injury, that the Court finds
sufficient to satisfy the injury requirement.
C. Constitutional Requirements 2 & 3: Causation and Redressability
After meeting the requirement of injury in fact, a plaintiff still must meet
the other two constitutional standing requirements: causation and
redressability. The causation component of the standing analysis "examines
the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged
injury." '5 The redressability component "examines the causal connection
between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested."'5 The Court has
maintained that these two requirements are distinct, yet they are clearly
related.'53 In fact, they are often treated as one question: "Did the defendant
cause the harm such that it can be concluded that limiting the defendant will
remedy the injury?"'" 4 This question must be answered in the affirmative for
a plaintiff to have standing.
Generally, the analysis of causation and redressability is straightforward.
For example, in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,55 the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff did not have standing because there was not "a sufficient nexus
between her injury and the government action which she attack[ed] to justify
judicial intervention."' 56 The plaintiff was the mother of an illegitimate child
147. Id. at 562.
148. Id. at 567.
149. Id. at 572.
150. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973).
151. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984).
152. Id.
153. CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 52.
154. CHEMERINSKY 2, supra note 96, §2.5.1, at 58.
155. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).




whose father was not providing support for the child.'57 The case concerned
the District Attorney's refusal to prosecute the father for nonsupport on the
grounds that the child was illegitimate.'58 The Court did not find that the
plaintiffs injury - lack of support from the father - was connected to the
government action - failure to prosecute the father. 59 Thus, there was a lack
of causation. Furthermore, prosecution of the father would not necessarily
redress the injury. Prosecuting the father would not make him support the
child. Thus, the Court held that the mother did not have standing. 6'
The only time the standards for causation and redressability relax is when
a plaintiff sues over a violation of governmental procedure. According to the
Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, "[T]he person who has been accorded
a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy."' 6'' The
Court stated that:
one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a
federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing
agency's failure to prepare [a statutorily mandated] environmental
impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any
certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or
altered, and even though the dam will not be completed for many
years. 1
62
Thus, if a statute requires a particular procedure to be followed, and a step
which may affect the outcome of the procedure is skipped, a plaintiff should
not be denied standing for not being able to show that his injury would have
been avoided had the step not been skipped, or that requiring the step would
change the outcome and the injury.
Some scholars argue that the causation and redressability requirements are
proper because they prevent courts from rendering merely advisory
opinions. 6 If the court cannot fix the harm, it has no business hearing the
case. Others argue that causation and redressability are improper because it
is unfair to decide them based solely on pleadings."6 Justice Stevens has
noted that "[t]he purpose of the standing inquiry is to measure the plaintiff's
157. Id. at 614-15.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 618.
160. Id. at 618-19.
161. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
162. Id.
163. CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 52.
164. Id.
2003]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
stake in the outcome, not whether a court has the authority to provide it with
the outcome it seeks."' 65 Regardless of what courts may decide in the future,
for now, causation and redressability are constitutionally required elements of
standing, and therefore must be considered in any standing analysis.
D. Prudential Limitations
Along with the constitutional standing requirements, courts often consider
two prudential limitations on the court's ability to hear cases: (1) a plaintiff
may not raise a .third-party claim, and (2) a plaintiff may not raise a
generalized grievance. " The difference between the constitutional
requirements and the prudential limitations is that the constitutional
requirements must be met in every case, whereas Congress may overrule the
prudential limitations.'67 This difference lies in the fact that the prudential
limitations are not based on constitutional requirements, but rather on
"prudent judicial administration."' 68 The courts created these limitations
because
[w]ithout such limitations - closely related to Art. III concerns
but essentially matters of judicial self-governance - the courts
would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public
significance even though other governmental institutions may be
more competent to address the questions and even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.1
69
Thus, courts created the prudential limitations in the interest of judicial
economy, and they serve to limit cases that raise issues that would be better
dealt with by one of the other branches of government.
Congress may grant a right to sue, either expressly or implicitly in a statute,
to persons normally barred by prudential standing limitations. '70 For example,
in Federal Election Commission v. Akins,' 7' the Supreme Court found that the
plaintiffs had standing based on a clause in the congressional statute on which
the suit was based.'7 The plaintiffs were a group of voters who contested the
Federal Election Commission's (FEC) determination that the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was not a political committee as defined
165. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 790 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 54.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
170. Id. at 501.
171. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).




by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197 1. This determination meant
that AIPAC did not have to conform to certain regulations, such as disclosure
of members and expenditures.17  The FEC claimed that the plaintiffs
presented only a generalized grievance. 75  However, the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 said that "'[a]ny person who believes a violation of
this Act ... has occurred, may file a complaint with the Commission,"' and
further that "'[a nyparty aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing
a complaint filed by such party... may file a petition' in district court seeking
review of that dismissal."' 7'  The prudential limitation against generalized
grievances would have barred such a suit, but Congress had expressly granted
the right to sue. Thus, the plaintiffs had standing and the case proceeded.
1. Third-Party Claims
The first of the two prudential limitations prohibits third-party suits. The
Court has stated that a plaintiff's claim must be based on his own legal rights
and interests, not on those of a third party.177 There are two reasons for this
limitation. First, it prevents unnecessary adjudication: "[lIt may be that in
fact the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be
able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or
not."'178 Second, it ensures that the plaintiff is the best party to litigate the
claim: "[T]hird parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their
own rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy, and therefore should
prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective advocates of those
rights are before them."'179  Thus, a plaintiff raising a third-party claim
generally does not have standing.
An example of an improper third-party claim is found in Gilmore v. Utah.80
In Gilmore, a convicted murderer's mother sought a stay of execution despite
her son's waiver of his right to appeal.' 8 ' The Supreme Court found that the
mother lacked standing because there was no controversy between the state
and the mother.'82 Because the mother was raising the claim of a third party,
the murderer, she did not have standing.
173. Id. at 13.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id. at 19 (quoting 2 U.S.C. §§ 437g(a)(1), (a)(8)(A) (1994)) (alterations in original)
(emphasis added).
177. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
178. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976).
179. Id. at 114.
180. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
181. Id. at 1013 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
182. Id. at 1016-17 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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There are exceptions to the third-party claims limitation. When the
countervailing considerations outweigh the general reasons behind the
limitation, the limitation is improper." 3 Furthermore, the rule against third-
party claims "should not be applied where its underlying justifications are
absent."'" In Craig v. Boren,"8 5 the Court held that "a decision by us to forgo
consideration of the constitutional merits in order to await the initiation of a
new challenge to the statute by injured third parties would be impermissibly
to foster repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the guise of caution
and prudence." '86 Additionally, the principle does not apply to cases where
a litigant suffers an actual injury despite not being a member of the class
whose rights are being violated." 7
The Court generally considers two elements when deciding whether to
apply the third-party claim limitation: (1) the relationship between the
plaintiff and the person with the right, and (2) whether the person with the
right is in a position to assert the right.'88 Thus, the Court may allow a third-
party claim when a litigant and the third party have such a relationship that the
litigant may only engage in a particular activity if the third party has the right
in question.'89 For example, an abortion doctor may sue for a woman's right
to have an abortion because the doctor's activities depend on the woman's
rights.
90
The court may also allow a third-party claim when the affected party is
unable to assert the right personally, such as when an organization asserts its
members' right to anonymity, because the members are unable to assert that
right themselves while maintaining it.'9' An example is found in Barrows v.
Jackson,'92 wherein the court maintained the validity of the general rule
against third-party claims while making an exception to this rule. 93 In
183. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975).
184. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
185. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, a liquor vendor challenged the constitutionality of a
state statute prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of twenty-one, but allowing the
sale of beer to females over the age of eighteen. Id. at 192. The Court held that the vendor had
standing, despite the fact that she was not the object of the government action, because she had
suffered an actual economic injury as a result of the unconstitutional statute. Id. at 194.
186. Id. at 193-94.
187. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1953).
188. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114-16.
189. Id. at 114-15.
190. See id. at 115; see also Craig, 429 U.S. at 194 (allowing a litigant to raise a third-party
claim based on the relationship between vendor and customer - the vendor suffered an injury
when the customer was denied the right to purchase an item).
191. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
192. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).




Barrows, a homeowner was sued for allowing violation of a restrictive
covenant disallowing the sale of realty to non-Caucasians.'94 As a defense, the
homeowner claimed that it would be unconstitutional for the state court to rule
in such a way as to enforce the covenant. 193 This was clearly a third-party
claim, yet the Court held that because the affected parties were unable to raise
the claim, an exception was appropriate. 96 When denying standing would
cause a group's constitutional rights to be violated because the people
possessing the right would not be able to assert those rights in court, the need
to protect those constitutional rights outweighs the reasons underlying the rule
against third-party claims.'97
2. Generalized Grievances
The second prudential limitation prohibits generalized grievances. A
generalized grievance is one in which the impact on the plaintiff is exactly the
same as the impact on all members of the public.'98 The Supreme Court has
"consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance
about government - claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no
more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large" should
not be found to have standing. 99
There are exceptions, however. Indeed, "[t]o deny standing to persons who
are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean
that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be
questioned by nobody."'" Usually, the generalized grievance limitation is
cited as a reason to deny standing in cases where the harm not only is
widespread, but also is vague and poorly defined, such as damage to an
interest in seeing the law followed. 20 ' However, if a plaintiff can overcome
the actual injury requirement, it is likely that he can also overcome the
generalized grievance limitation.
194. Id. at 251-52.
195. Id. at 254-55.
196. Id. at 257.
197. Id.
198. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (per curiam) (the impact is
"plainly undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the public"') (quoting Exparte Levitt,
302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
199. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,573-74 (1992); see also Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
200. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
201. Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998).
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In summary, to have standing a plaintiff must allege (1) an injury (2) caused
by the defendant that is (3) redressable by the court. Furthermore, the court
may deny standing in cases involving third-party claims or generalized
grievances. These requirements can be quite difficult to meet, and if a
plaintiff cannot meet them, no justiciable claim exists. Therefore, as a first
step in every potential litigation, every plaintiff must evaluate whether he has
standing. This holds equally true for potential plaintiffs in a suit against a
President for violation of the War Powers Resolution.
V. Who Has Standing to Sue a President for Violation of the War Powers
Resolution?
There is perhaps an unlimited number of people who feel that they should
be able to sue a President for violation of the War Powers Resolution, but only
a handful whose claims could stand up to the most cursory assessment.
Whether even those claims could stand up to more rigorous examination is
another matter. Possible plaintiffs in a suit against a President for violating
the Resolution include individual members of Congress, a majority of
Congress suing together, an injured member of the public, and military
personnel. Below is an analysis of each of these groups, and an attempt to
predict whether the Court would, in fact, find that each has standing.
A. Individual Members of Congress
Congressional standing is an area in which the abundance of recent
decisions dealing with the issue only modestly helps predict what the Supreme
Court will do in a particular case - unless, of course, the facts are nearly
identical to a previous case. An overview of these recent decisions and
associated commentary reveals the controversial nature of congressional
standing.2"2 Some commentators have suggested that courts should never find
that members of Congress have standing when they are suing as legislators.2"3
Nonetheless, courts sometimes have granted standing to legislators, as in the
D.C. Circuit case Michel v. Anderson.2° In Michel, several members of
Congress, along with individual voters, challenged a rule of the House of
Representatives allowing delegates from Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin
Islands, American Samoa, and the District of Columbia to vote in the
Committee of the Whole.20 5 In allowing the case, the Michel court held that
202. Jonathan L. Entin, The Dog That Rarely Barks: Why the Courts Won't Resolve the War
Powers Debate, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1305, 1309 (1997).
203. Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 73, at 213.
204. 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).




congressmen have "standing to assert that their voting power has been
diluted."20 6 However, decisions since Michel have not been so liberal in their
standing assessments.
One such case is Raines v. Byrd,2" 7 in which six members of Congress
claimed that the Line Item Veto was unconstitutional.08 The U.S. Supreme
Court held that the members of Congress lacked standing to bring the suit,
primarily because of a lack of a sufficient personal stake or concrete injury.
20 9
The Court reasoned that:
First, appellees have not been singled out for specially unfavorable
treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective bodies.
Their claim is that the Act causes a type of institutional injury (the
diminution of legislative power), which necessarily damages all
Members of Congress and both Houses of Congress equally.
Second, appellees do not claim that they have been deprived of
something to which they personally are entitled - such as their
seats as Members of Congress after their constituents had elected
them. Rather, appellees' claim of standing is based on a loss of
political power, not loss of any private right, which would make
the injury more concrete.210
The Court held that Michel did not apply because the appellees were able to
vote on the Act, and their votes were in no way diminished - they simply
lost.21 ' Another factor in the Court's decision was the fact that Congress could
prevent the use of the Line Item Veto in ways other than resorting to the
judiciary, such as a "vote to repeal the Act, or to exempt a given
appropriations bill (or a given provision in an appropriations bill) from the
Act.' 212 After all, the Court stated, the judicial ruling of a Legislative or
Executive act as unconstitutional "has been recognized as a tool of last resort
on the part of the federal judiciary throughout its nearly 200 years of
existence. '
The D.C. Circuit Court applied the same reasoning in Chenoweth v.
Clinton.2 14 In Chenoweth, four U.S. Representatives sued President Clinton,
206. Id. at 625.
207. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
208. Id. at 814.
209. Id. at 818, 830.
210. Id. at 821 (citation omitted).
211. Id. at 824.
212. Id.
213. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 474 (1982).
214. 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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claiming that his creation of the American Heritage Rivers Initiative (AHRI)
by executive order was unconstitutional."' They based their standing
argument on "the deprivation of their right as Members of the Congress to
vote on (or, more precisely, against) the AHRI."2 16 The court found their
stated basis to be insufficient, based on the Raines precedent." 7
The most recent congressional standing case, and the most important to the
analysis of whether a member of Congress has standing to sue a President for
violating the War Powers Resolution, is Campbell v. Clinton. In Campbell,
a number of Congressmen sued President Clinton for violating the War
Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause of the Constitution by sending
troops to Yugoslavia to join a NATO campaign." 8 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit held that the Congressmen lacked standing." 9 The court
reasoned that the claim that the President acted illegally did not constitute a
nullification of a congressional vote.22" The court found that the members of
Congress still could have exercised legislative power to stop the war if they
had so chosen.22" ' The court suggested that:
[i]n this case, Congress certainly could have passed a law
forbidding the use of U.S. forces in the Yugoslav campaign;
indeed, there was a measure... introduced to require the President
to withdraw U.S. troops .... [Hiowever, ... this measure was
defeated by a 139 to 290 vote. Of course, Congress always retains
appropriations authority and could have cut off funds for the
American role in the conflict. Again there was an effort to do so
but it failed .... And there always remains the possibility of
impeachment should a President act in disregard of Congress'
authority on these matters.222
Commentators have criticized the Campbell decision 2 3 but it is the
215. Id. at 112.
216. Id. at 113.
217. Id. at 115.
218. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 22.
221. Id. at23.
222. Id.
223. See Michael Hahn, Note, The Conflict in Kosovo: A Constitutional War?, 89 GEO. L.J.
2351, 2381-86 (2001) ("Justice Scalia and Judge Bork... have argued that standing should not
be conferred on congressional plaintiffs because doing so would allow an unelected judiciary
to encroach on the prerogatives of the other two branches of government.... [However, this]
view is problematic because it eliminates the role of the judiciary in checking the power of the




currently prevailing precedent in the D.C. Circuit, which is an appropriate
jurisdiction for a lawsuit by a member of Congress against a President for
violation of the War Powers Resolution. This is one of those rare situations
in which it should be easy to predict what that court will do if a future suit is
filed because there is a recent, almost identical case. On the other hand, the
plaintiffs in Campbell, Chenoweth, and Raines probably thought that their
cases were easily predictable because each argued a slight variation on the
claim deemed adequate in Michel - that their voting power had been diluted.
It is not a substantial leap to assume that if dilution of voting power is a
sufficient injury, complete denial of voting power must be even more
adequate. The D.C. Circuit, at least, has ruled otherwise. Campbell came
only six years after Michel. It is therefore unclear what courts will decide the
next time this issue arises. For the time being, it appears that a member of
Congress does not have standing to sue a President for violating the War
Powers Resolution.
B. A Majority of Congress
In each of the cases in which an individual member of Congress was not
granted standing, the courts pointed out that the plaintiff was not in the
majority. 22' This leads to a natural question: Does a majority of Congress
together have standing to sue a President for violating the War Powers
Resolution? There certainly appears to be precedent for an affirmative
answer. In Coleman v. Miller,225 the plaintiffs were twenty state senators who
challenged the ability of the Kansas Lieutenant Governor to cast a tie-breaking
vote in favor of ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment, claiming
their votes against ratification had "been overridden and virtually held for
naught although if they [had been] right in their contentions their votes would
have been sufficient to defeat ratification. '2 26 The Court held that "these
senators ha[d] a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the
effectiveness of their votes." '227 An analogous situation would occur if a
majority of Congress were to vote against war, and a President waged war
anyway. In such a situation, that majority would also have a "plain, direct and
adequate interest" in their votes, and standing would be appropriate.
In fact, this solution was proposed by the D.C. District Court in Dellums v.
Bush,228 in which fifty-three members of the House of Representatives and one
224. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 824 (1997); Campbell, 203 F.3d at 23; Chenoweth
v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
225. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
226. Id. at 438.
227. Id.
228. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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U.S. Senator requested an injunction to prevent President George H.W. Bush
from initiating a military attack against Iraq prior to obtaining congressional
approval,229 as mandated by the War Powers Resolution2 a0 and the
Constitution.23" ' The suit was filed on November 19, 1990, on the premise that
the President was about to wage war, which allegedly would be
unconstitutional without congressional approval, and which would "deprive
the congressional plaintiffs of the voice to which they are entitled under the
Constitution." '232
The Dellums court first addressed the issue of injury. The plaintiffs
claimed that they were in imminent danger of injury to their constitutionally
guaranteed power to declare war.2 33 The court reasoned that this claim
"state[d] a legally-cognizable injury, for... members of Congress plainly
have an interest in protecting their right to vote on matters entrusted to their
respective chambers by the Constitution." '234 The court also addressed the
argument that the Constitution only gives Congress the power to declare war,
not avoid it:
[I]f the War Clause is to have its normal meaning, [the
Constitution] excludes from the power to declare war all branches
other than the Congress. It also follows that if the Congress
decides that United States forces should not be employed in
foreign hostilities, and if the Executive does not of its own volition
abandon participation in such hostilities, action by the courts
would appear to be the only available means to break the deadlock
in favor of the constitutional provision.2 35
Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had met the requirement of injury
in fact.2 36 Furthermore, the court concluded that "in principle, an injunction
may issue at the request of Members of Congress to prevent the conduct of a
war which is about to be carried on without congressional authorization."2 37
Although the plaintiffs had standing, the Dellums court ultimately decided
the issue was nonjusticiable because it lacked ripeness. The court used the
ripeness test announced in Goldwater v. Carter:2 38 "[A] dispute between
229. Id. at 1143.
230. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 3, 87 Stat. 555, 555.
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
232. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1144.
233. Id. at 1147.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1144 n.5.
236. Id. at 1148.
237. Id. at 1149.




Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until
each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority. ' 239 In this
case, Congress had not voted, so the case was not ripe. The Court stated that
[i]t would be both premature and presumptuous for the Court to
render a decision on the issue of whether a declaration of war is
required at this time or in the near future when the Congress itself
has provided no indication whether it deems such a declaration
either necessary, on the one hand, or imprudent, on the other.240
The court recognized that even if Congress issued a joint resolution against
war, the President would probably ignore it "if he is persuaded that the
Constitution affirmatively gives him the power to act otherwise," but Congress
was required to make the effort before resorting to a judicial solution.24'
The Dellums court pointed out that the problems surrounding congressional
suits "are avoided by a requirement that the plaintiffs in an action of this kind
be or represent a majority of the Members of the Congress," because Congress
as an institution is the only body able to exert its institutional power.242
Consequently, it may be argued that if a majority of Congress were to sue after
a congressional vote that the President disregards, the courts would grant that
majority standing.
The Supreme Court has said as much in dicta in other cases. In Raines, the
Court stated that, based on the Coleman holding, "legislators whose votes
would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have
standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into
effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.
243
Applying this reasoning, if a majority of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives were to challenge a President's deployment of troops without
following the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, it would probably
be deemed to have standing. This is because such a majority would have had
enough voting power to prevent the President's action if the deployment had
not prevented that vote.2 "
A final important point concerns another factor the Court has considered
in recent congressional standing cases: the availability of other courses of
239. Id. at 997.
240. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1149-50 (citation omitted).
241. Id. at 1149.
242. Id. at 1151. "[It is only if the majority of the Congress seeks relief from an
infringement on its constitutional war-declaration power that it may be entitled to receive it."
Id.
243. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997).
244. Entin, supra note 202, at 1309.
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action. However, in practical terms, before a majority of Congress would ever
collectively sue a President, it probably would have already exhausted other
courses of action, coming to the judiciary as a last resort. For example, the
majority could be in the process of impeaching the President but would want
to get an injunction against deployment in the meantime because impeachment
can be a lengthy process. This would especially be true if the military action
is particularly distasteful and calls for a rapid withdrawal of troops. Because
it is unlikely that a majority of Congress would resort to the judiciary before
trying other courses of action, it is unlikely the Court would have that
objection. Nonetheless, if a majority of Congress were to decide to sue, it
should first consider whether other options exist. If the members do so, case
law indicates that a majority of Congress would have standing to sue a
President for violation of the War Powers Resolution.
C. Members of the Public
The greatest obstacle a member of the general public would need to
overcome in the area of standing to sue a President for violation of the War
Powers Resolution is the prudential limitation against generalized grievances.
As discussed in Part IV.D.2, this limitation prevents suits where a plaintiff's
injury is common to all citizens or all taxpayers and is founded only on an
interest in seeing the government follow the law.245 Therefore, if a member
of the public trying to sue a President for violation of the War Powers
Resolution claimed that his injury was based on his interest in seeing the law
followed, the court may decide not to grant standing because every citizen has
suffered that same injury.
Prohibiting generalized grievance claims is especially important when it
concerns the actions of the government. The Supreme Court has stated that
[p]roper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional
structure requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a
confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal
Government, nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication claims
of constitutional violation by other branches of government where
the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury.24
Because a lawsuit accusing a President of violating the War Powers
Resolution definitely constitutes a confrontation with another branch of
government, the Court must be especially certain that the plaintiff has a
245. CHEMERINSKY 1, supra note 76, at 58.
246. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ars. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454




sufficient injury, and it is more likely to apply this prudential limitation.
However, the prohibition against generalized grievances is only a prudential
limitation, not a constitutional requirement, and thus is not an absolute bar for
standing. It is rare for a plaintiff to allege an injury shared by many and
nevertheless be granted standing, but it can be done. The Supreme Court
recently said, "Often the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact that it is
widely shared go hand in hand. But their association is not invariable, and
where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found 'injury
in fact' ."247 The Court further stated that "the fact that [an injury] is widely
shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its
vindication in the federal courts." 48 Thus, it is possible to have standing
when a suit is based on an actual injury, even though the injury is widespread.
The Court recognized this possibility in Flast v. Cohen, when it allowed a
suit by a taxpayer alleging that a federal taxing and spending program was
unconstitutional.249 The Court reasoned that whether a particular taxpayer has
a sufficient personal stake in the outcome depends on the facts of that case." °
Furthermore, the court in Michel v. Anderson recognized that individual voters
have standing to assert that the votes of their elected representatives have been
diluted. 5 ' The Michel court reasoned that "[i]t could not be argued seriously
that voters would not have an injury if their congressman was not permitted
to vote at all on the House floor."25 In both of these cases, the fact that all of
the taxpayers and all of the voters suffered the same injury was not
dispositive. Although the injury was widespread, it was nevertheless an
injury.
The determining factor for standing appears to be the type of injury alleged.
In both Flast and Michel, the plaintiff suffered a definite injury, one which
could almost be quantified, whereas an interest in seeing the President follow
the law seems to be an abstract injury at best. For an illustration, contrast the
Line Item Veto cases. In Raines v. Byrd, members of Congress claimed the
Line Item Veto was unconstitutional and alleged that they suffered a loss of
political power.253 The Court deemed this injury too abstract and denied
standing.254 In Clinton v. City of New York, 55 the plaintiffs made exactly the
247. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
248. Id. at 25.
249. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
250. Id.
251. Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
252. Id.
253. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997).
254. Id. at 829.
255. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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same claim, but based their claim on actual economic loss suffered as a result
of the use of the Line Item Veto on portions of the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.256 This injury was just as
widespread as the injury alleged in Raines, yet the Court found standing.257
This was because "the parties ... alleged a 'personal stake' in having an
actual injury redressed rather than an 'institutional injury' that is 'abstract and
widely dispersed." 258 Therefore, the deciding factor was not the number of
people who suffered the alleged injury, but rather the injury's nature.
A plaintiff suing a President for violation of the War Powers Resolution
therefore must define his injury as concrete and personal, despite its
widespread nature. Optimally, the injury should be quantifiable as well.
Certainly, the injury must be traceable to the war, although it would not be
necessary to allege that forcing the President to comply with the War Powers
Resolution would end the war, based on the precedent of Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife.259 The plaintiff would also need to point out the relationship with
his members of Congress to avoid the prohibition against third-party claims,
based on the precedent of Michel v. Anderson.
The plaintiff possibly could allege that his taxes are funding an
unconstitutional war, in which case the plaintiff could refer the Court to its
decision in Flast. Another possible claim could be an economic loss as a
result of a bad wartime economy or because of social unrest if the war is
particularly unpopular and rioting ensues, resulting in damage to property or
people. A plaintiff could also allege actual physical injury if the war brought
attacks to U.S. soil, although even these may not be adequate because, based
on the precedent of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court could hold that the
low likelihood of further injury makes the existing injury insufficient.
Ultimately, it is likely that if the alleged injury is concrete and personal, a
member of the general public would have standing to sue a President for
violation of the War Powers Resolution.
D. Military Personnel
Standing is based primarily on injury. All of the Constitutional
requirements revolve around the injury alleged, as do the prudential
limitations against generalized grievances and third-party claims.2" Arguably,
256. Id. at 420-21.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 430.
259. 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) ("The person who has been accorded a procedural right
to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards
for redressability and immediacy.").




those who suffer the most injury in a war are military personnel. Thus, one
would assume that military personnel would have standing to sue a President
for violation of the War Powers Resolution.
No Supreme Court precedent exists for such a decision, so a full standing
analysis should be undertaken to discover if such an assumption is valid.
Injury would not be a difficult requirement to satisfy. Military personnel are
always injured in war, both physically and emotionally. They are often
financially injured as well by missing work, rehabilitation following injury or
trauma, or through the loss of business or educational opportunities,
particularly if they were drafted, as opposed to career military.
The second requirement is causation, which would also be easy to satisfy.
War causes injuries to military personnel, and would be fairly traceable to the
President's violation of the War Powers Resolution. The precedent of the
relaxed causation requirements from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife applies,26
so the plaintiff need not allege that there would be no war if the President had
complied with the War Powers Resolution. Likewise, the plaintiff does not
need to allege that forcing compliance would end the war, so redressability
would be satisfied as well.
The next consideration is the prudential limitation against third-party
claims, because Congress actually possesses the right to declare war, not
military personnel. However, one of the exceptions seems to apply in such a
situation: military personnel benefit from Congress' right to declare war, and
they cannot benefit from a right that Congress cannot exercise. Thus, based
on the precedent of Craig v. Boren, the third-party claims limitation would not
apply. The prudential limitation against generalized grievances likewise
would not apply because the plaintiff suffers a concrete, personal injury,
demonstrated by the precedent of Flast, Michel, and Clinton.
Therefore, a court could decide that military personnel have standing to sue
a President for violation of the War Powers Resolution under a strict standing
analysis. However, it is unlikely that any member of the military would ever
file such a suit. After all, "there are powerful disincentives for members of
the armed forces to bring such a lawsuit: career officers would risk sacrificing
their careers, while enlisted personnel would be challenging authority in ways
that are fundamentally inconsistent with the values and ethos promoted by
injury alleged since it has been demonstrated that a plaintiff who is not the subject of a
governmental action, but who is nonetheless injured, may have standing despite the prohibition
against third-party claims. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
261. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
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their training and indoctrination." '262 But that does not mean it could never
happen; "a lawsuit requires only one plaintiff.' 263
VI. Political Question Doctrine
A court would probably hold that a majority of Congress suing jointly,
personally injured members of the public, and military personnel would have
standing to sue a President for violation of the War Powers Resolution.
However, the court may nevertheless decline to hear the case if it finds that
the case is otherwise nonjusticiable. If a court finds that the plaintiffs have
standing, then it is not likely to find that the case is not ripe or moot. As
discussed in Part IV.A, a case that is not ripe often lacks the injury
requirement, and a moot case is often considered unredressable. However,
sometimes a plaintiff has standing, yet the case violates the political question
doctrine, a well-established component of justiciability.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "a party may have standing in a
particular case, but the federal court may nevertheless decline to pass on the
merits of the case because.., it presents a political question." 26" This occurs
because "[tihe question whether a particular person is a proper party to
maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers
problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other
branches of the Federal Government., 265 In other words, the mere fact that a
party has standing does not mean that there is not a political question.
However, the political question doctrine is "sensitive and complex," and so
courts usually "turn initially, although not invariably, to the question of
standing to sue.,,2' Therefore, many cases that violate the political question
doctrine never address the political question problem because the party is first
found not to have standing.
It should be noted that a political question differs from a political issue.
The court may decide questions dealing with political issues.267 The political
question doctrine is founded on "the separation of powers and the inherent
limits of judicial abilities,, 26' and on the idea that some issues are committed
to Congress or the President, and thus are not justiciable.269 The Court has
262. Entin, supra note 202, at 1310.
263. Id.
264. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
265. Id.
266. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974) (citation
omitted).
267. A perfect example is Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
268. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (D.D.C. 1990).




repeatedly stressed that the judiciary does not have "unconditioned authority
to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts. "27 In Flast,
the Court noted that "no justiciable controversy is presented when the parties
seek adjudication of only a political question."27' In Lujan, the Court further
stated that "[v]indicating the public interest ... is the function of Congress
and the Chief Executive. 272
In United States v. Richardson,273 the Court commented on complaints
about justiciability issues:
[a]ny other conclusion [than requiring application of the political
question doctrine] would mean that the Founding Fathers intended
to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a
New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National
Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts. The
Constitution created a representative Government with the
representatives directly responsible to their constituents at stated
periods of two, four, and six years; that the Constitution does not
afford ajudicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable the
citizen who is not satisfied with the [actions of the
government].... Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the
traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system
provides for changing members of the political branches when
dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow
electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing
duties committed to them.
274
Thus, the political question doctrine is an integral part of the democratic
system of government.
The political question doctrine is defined as "[t]he judicial principle that a
court should refuse to decide an issue involving the exercise of discretionary
power by the executive or legislative branch of government., 275 As noted
above, there is a difference between a political question and a political
issue.276 For example, "[w]hile the Constitution grants to the political
THIRD CENTURY 1030 (2d ed. 1998).
270. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Arns. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
271. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
272. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
273. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
274. Id. at 179.
275. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (7th ed. 1999).
276. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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branches, and in particular to the Executive, responsibility for conducting the
nation's foreign affairs, it does not follow that the judicial power is excluded
from the resolution of cases merely because they may touch upon such
affairs 277 Rather, it is excluded only from deciding cases pertaining to
judgment calls by elected officials. In fact, the Court has stated that deciding
whether one of the branches of government has overstepped its constitutional
authority is "a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. 278
The primary factor in deciding whether a case violates the political question
doctrine seems to be whether the case involves a constitutional right.279 For
example, if someone sued Congress for voting to raise taxes, the case would
violate the political question doctrine. Raising taxes is a discretionary
function of Congress. On the other hand, if someone sued Congress for
raising taxes without first presenting it to the President, the case would not
violate the political question doctrine. The Constitution states that "[a]ll Bills
for raising Revenue. . . shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the
President ... ,20 Therefore, presenting a bill to the President is not
discretionary, and the judiciary may decide the case.
It logically follows that if someone sues the President for deciding to go to
war, the case would violate the political question doctrine, because that
decision is discretionary. However, if someone sues the President for going
to war without first asking Congress, the case would not violate the political
question doctrine because the War Powers Resolution, which is based on
Congress' constitutional power to declare war, mandates that the President
must do so. This is an instance where it is a political issue, but not a political
question. Whether to go to war is a political question; following the
delegation of each branch's constitutional powers is not. Therefore, if a
plaintiff were deemed to have standing to sue a President for violation of the
War Powers Resolution, it is unlikely that the court would deem the case
otherwise nonjusticiable for violating the political question doctrine.
VII. Conclusion
The Legislative and Executive branches have opposing views as to who
holds the power to do what regarding war. The Judicial branch has a duty to
resolve this constitutional dilemma. There have been prior cases involving the
war powers, but the plaintiff has never been the correct person to raise the
277. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1990).
278. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
279. Id.




claim. At some point in the future, the proper plaintiff will raise the claim,
and the judiciary will finally be able to settle the question of which branch
holds the war powers.
The case that settles the question likely will be predicated on a President's
violation of the War Powers Resolution. A determination of the
constitutionality of the Resolution will essentially define war in the context
of Congress' power to declare war. The party to bring the suit to court for
adjudication could be a majority of Congress suing jointly, a personally
injured member of the public, or military personnel, because each of these
three groups would have standing to sue the President for violation of the War
Powers Resolution. Therefore, it is possible, and in fact probable, that a case
will arise that will require the Court to finally resolve the tension between
Congress and the President regarding the war powers.
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